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Insider Trading and United States v.
O'Hagan: The Supreme Court Reinstates
Securities Fraud Convictions Based on
the Misappropriation Theory
Rachel Goldstein
It can begin with an innocent conversation. It can happen
any time, any place, in public or behind closed doors. It has been
known to involve Wall Street executives,1 stockbrokers,2 doctors,3
lawyers,4 lottery directors,5 New York City's finest,6 and even
print shop employees.' What is it? It is insider trading.
In the absence of a statutory definition, insider trading has,
by default, been defined by case law; the law of insider trading has
been extensively developed by the courts. The landmark case of
1 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Boesky, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,991 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Levine, 689 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Securities &
Exch. Comm'n v. Siegel, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
2 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (convicting securities trader of
Rule 10b-5 violation for trading on inside securities information obtained from employees
of stock brokerage); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing
conviction on Stockbroker's Rule lOb-5 due to absence of a showing of a fiduciary relation-
ship existing between stockbroker's client and client's wife regarding inside information
pertaining to client's wife's family business).
3 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), later pro-
ceeding, 825 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (convicting psychiatrist of securities fraud for
giving his stockbroker inside information he obtained from his patient, the wife of a corpo-
rate executive). In 1995, a psychotherapist admitted guilt to insider trading resulting from
investing in his patient's company after being tipped by the patient, an aerospace company
executive, about the company's planned merger with another company. Jeff Cole, Execu-
tive's Therapist Pleads Guilty to Fraud in Trading of Lockheed Stock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
1995, at B5.
4 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997); United States v. Reich, 661 F.
Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying motion to reduce 366-day sentence for crime of securi-
ties fraud). In 1987, a 34-year-old lawyer was convicted of 38 counts of insider trading after
he tipped family and friends to invest in a company that the lawyer learned through his
law firm was planning a corporate restructuring. James Sterngold, Lawyer, 34, Is Con-
victed of Passing Insider Tips, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 19, 1987, at Dl, D2.
5 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
6 In 1983, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged four New York police
officers, along with five other New York residents, with illegally earning over $1.2 million
from trading on inside information regarding tender offers they obtained from a New York
law firm that was working on the offers. Richard L. Hudson and Tim Metz, SEC Charges
That 4 Policemen, 5 Others Earned $1.2 Million on Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12,
1983 at 8.
7 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.8
defined "insider" as referring to "employees as well as officers, di-
rectors and controlling stockholders who are in possession of ma-
terial undisclosed information obtained in the course of their
employment."9 Material information was defined as information
"which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the
value of the corporation's stock or securities ... ."1o Furthermore,
material information was also extended to include information
which, if known, would clearly affect "investment judgment,"" or
which directly bears on the intrinsic value of a company's stock.'"
The significance of Texas Gulf Sulphur lies not only in its use-
ful definitions of insider trading, but also in its far-reaching deci-
sion regarding the prohibition on insider trading. In Texas Gulf
Sulphur, officers, directors and employees of a large minerals com-
pany secretly profited from trading on material, nonpublic infor-
mation they received regarding the company's successful
exploratory mining activities in Canada. 13 Instead of refraining
from acting on this information until it was released to the share-
holders and to the public, the defendants secretly purchased
shares of company stock, enabling these insiders to enjoy tremen-
dous profits once the information was publicly released. The com-
pany also published misleading press releases informing the
public that its exploratory mining activities were inconclusive at a
time when defendants already knew the company's mining activi-
ties had been tremendously successful in yielding valuable copper
deposits.'4
The court held two of the defendants had committed securi-
ties trading violations under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 In essence, the court held that
these defendants violated the law by trading on material, nonpub-
lic information. The case set an important precedent for future
cases involving classic "insiders" and illegality of insider trading
based on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
8 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), affd in part and rev'd in part en banc, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
9 Id. at 279 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (pointing out
that Section 10(b) refers to an "insider" as "any person," which includes persons who are
not directors, officers or major stockholders)).
10 Id. at 280 (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965),
citing Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)).
11 Id. at 280 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911).
12 Id. at 280 (referring to Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Ward LaFrance Truck
Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943)).
13 Id. at 262.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 287 n.23.
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In addition, Texas Gulf Sulphur dealt with insiders known as
tippers.'6 A tipper is "a person who possesses material inside in-
formation, and who makes selective disclosure of such information
for trading or other personal purposes." 7 Inside information is re-
garded as company information that is not publicly disclosed and
could be used to facilitate personal market transactions.'" Posses-
sion of material inside market information may give rise to a duty
to either reveal that material inside information prior to trading
on it, or refrain from trading on the basis of the material inside
information altogether.19
The duty to disclose or abstain 0 from trading on the basis of
nonpublic material information does not arise from the mere pos-
session of inside information.2' Instead, it arises from the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties.22 A fiduciary
relationship is one involving an individual or entity who "is under
a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of the other party
upon matters within the scope of the relation."23 The term "in-
sider" presumes a fiduciary duty is owed by the insider to the per-
son from whom the insider receives material, undisclosed
information.24
Insider trading can also refer to the act of receiving material
information from insiders and then using that information to the
recipient's benefit, without disclosing that information.2 ' These
individuals are commonly referred to as "tippees."26 In the securi-
ties law area,27 a tippee is "a person who acquires material non-
16 Insiders are not the focus of the misappropriation theory; they are the focus of the
classical theory, which is beyond the topic of this case note. See generally Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646
(1983).
17 BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1484 (6th ed. 1990).
1s Gregory R. Andre, Note, Constructive Insider Liability and the Arm's Length Trans-
action Under Footnote 14 of Dirks, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 872, 872 n.1 (1984).
19 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part and rev'd in part en banc, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
20 The duty to disclose or abstain originated with the recognition of '[an affirmative
duty to disclose material information [, which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts,
have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment." The duty arises from i) the
existence of information only intended to be used for corporate purposes, and (ii) the unfair-
ness of allowing a corporate insider to benefit from trading on that information without
prior full disclosure. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961), cited in
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
21 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646.
22 Id. at 646 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S at 222).
23 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1939), Andre, supra note 18, at 875.
24 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991).
25 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
26 Id. at 230 n.12.
27 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1484 (6th ed. 1990).
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public information from another who enjoys a fiduciary
relationship with the company to which such information per-
tains."28  Tippees are generally distinguished from "outsiders."
Outsiders are viewed as neither insiders of companies, nor tippees
of insiders.29 While a tippee may differ from an outsider, in some
instances an outsider may be considered to owe the same fiduciary
duty as a tipper because of the outsider's fiduciary relationship to
the tippee.3 °
Tippees generally do not possess the kind of independent fidu-
ciary relationships with respect to the corporation and its share-
holders that tippers have.3 1 However, certain relationships, such
as those between attorneys (tippees) and their clients (tippers),
where confidential client company information may be shared
with other attorneys in the firm (outsiders), may cause the out-
sider with whom that confidential information is shared to be re-
garded not only as a tippee, but also as a fiduciary.32 In this
context, an outsider who uses the confidential information to the
outsider's sole benefit should, therefore, be regarded as breaching
his or her fiduciary duty to the company's shareholders because of
his or her fiduciary relationship to the tippee. The United States
Supreme Court confronted this issue in the insider trading case,
United States v. O'Hagan3
O'Hagan addresses the conduct of an "outsider" under Section
10(b) and accompanying Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.34 James Herman O'Hagan was an attorney, who
secretly profited from investing in a takeover target of his firm's
corporate clients after learning about the proposed takeover from
28 Id.
29 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1990).
3o For example, an attorney who is in-house counsel for a client is an insider because
he is also an employee of that client. If that attorney acts on nonpublic, material informa-
tion obtained from the client, that attorney becomes a tippee. An attorney who is not affili-
ated with a client's business but is acting on behalf of the client is generally considered an
outsider. Even as an outsider, however, the attorney still owes a fiduciary duty to the
attorney's client because of the fiduciary relationship that exists between attorneys and
clients. When an attorney is a partner in a law firm, that attorney also owes a fiduciary
duty to the other attorneys in the law firm and to those attorneys' clients. Therefore, an
attorney who acts on nonpublic, material information obtained from another attorney in
that firm and which belongs to a firm client, may also be viewed as a tippee. Supreme
Court Justice Ginsburg elaborated on the distinction between O'Hagan and Pillsbury, the
takeover target of a Dorsey & Whitney client, "Although an 'outsider' with respect to Pills-
bury, O'Hagan had an intimate association with, and was found to have traded on confiden-
tial information from, Dorsey & Whitney, counsel to tender offeror Grand Met." United
States v. 0' Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2221 n.5 (1997).
31 Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
32 Id.
33 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
34 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997). Regulation of insider trading is primarily federal in na-
ture. The SEC regulates deception requirements under the Securities Exch. Act of 1934
through Section 10(b) and disclosure requirements through antifraud provisions such as
Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1997).
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the client's attorney in the firm. The critical issue was whether
O'Hagan, a partner in the law firm which represented the bidder
of a takeover target, could be held liable for trading on and profit-
ing from the takeover information he obtained by talking with an-
other attorney in the firm. O'Hagan was originally convicted on
securities fraud, mail fraud and money laundering charges. 5
However, his convictions were overturned on appeal, based on the
court of appeal's narrow interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.16 The long-standing conflict37 among the lower courts in in-
terpreting whether the scope of the statutory language of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act extends to
insider trading cases such as O'Hagan culminated in the need for
the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue.
The specific issue was whether O'Hagan's securities fraud
convictions could be sustained under the "misappropriation the-
ory," which allows a broad prohibition against insider trading.
The misappropriation theory is one of two theories created under
Section 10(b)'s proscription of deception. The older theory is
known as the classical theory. The classical theory, based on
Texas Gulf Sulphur, is the original basis upon which insider trad-
ing has been proscribed9.3  This theory pertains only to an insider,
including a tippee of the insider, who has a fiduciary or similar
relationship to the company shareholders in whose stock the in-
sider traded.4' Under the classical theory, an "insider owes a fidu-
ciary duty to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside
information for his personal benefit."41
35 Securities Exch. Comm'n v. 0' Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Minn. 1995).
36 United States v. 0' Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1996).
37 Circuit courts which have applied the misappropriation theory to securities fraud
cases include: the Second Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981), Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); the Third Cir-
cuit, see, e.g., Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); the Seventh Circuit, see,
e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), Securities & Exch.
Comm'n v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); and the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., Securities &
Exch. Comm'n v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). Circuit courts that have rejected the
misappropriation theory in securities fraud cases include: the Fourth Circuit, see, e.g.,
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); and the Eighth Circuit, see, e.g.,
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 612.
38 O' Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616.
39 Id. at 616. The Eighth Circuit refers to Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980), as the
germinal case outlining the classical theory approach to the prohibition on insider trading.
"[Tihe duty to disclose arises when one party has information that the other party is enti-
tled to know because of a fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence between
them." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-35 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1976)).
40 Clark, 915 F.2d at 443.
41 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616 (quoting Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409). The classical theory
focuses solely on corporate "insiders"; that is, those within the corporation who personally
benefit by secretly trading on inside information they receive from the corporation regard-
ing the corporation's shares. The misappropriation theory, on the other hand, extends the
reach of the prohibition against insider trading to those traders who exhibit the same pro-
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O'Hagan was neither an insider of the company whose shares
were being traded, nor a tippee of any insider. Therefore, he falls
outside the reach of the classical theory.42 Thus, even though
O'Hagan traded securities based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion, he owed no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company
in whose stock he traded.43 However, O'Hagan is within the reach
of the misappropriation theory, which specifically extends the pro-
hibition against insider trading to trading by outsiders, such as
O'Hagan.41  The misappropriation theory "extends the reach of
Rule 10b-5 to outsiders who would not ordinarily be deemed fidu-
ciaries of the corporate entities in whose stock they trade ....
While it is clear that the classical theory does not apply to
O'Hagan, the Supreme Court's recent decision to reverse the
Eighth Circuit's ruling and uphold O'Hagan's convictions now
makes it equally clear that the misappropriation theory applies to
cases involving outsiders who trade on privileged information.
The Supreme Court's decision is consistent with several prior cir-
cuit court decisions46 that have applied the misappropriation the-
ory in insider trading cases. The decision puts an end to
inconsistent holdings made by some of the lower courts in apply-
ing the misappropriation theory. The Supreme Court has now es-
tablished a long awaited definitive ruling for insider trading cases
coming under this previously undefined area of securities law.
This case note will analyze the merits of the misappropriation
theory and set forth the reasons justifying the Supreme Court's
recent decision to apply the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan.
Part I will discuss the background and facts surrounding
O'Hagan. Part II will discuss the origins of the misappropriation
theory, particularly the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Part III will present the
arguments in support of the theory, looking specifically at previ-
ously decided cases which have applied and rejected the misappro-
priation theory as a basis for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability
and compare them to O'Hagan. Part IV will address the policy
scribed conduct, but who would not otherwise be liable because they are outsiders. The
misappropriation theory turns on the existence of a fiduciary duty between the misappro-
priation and the lawful possessor of that misappropriated information and whether a
breach of that duty occurred. Id.
42 Clark, 915 F.2d at 442.
43 O Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617 n.5.
44 Cherif, 933 F.2d at 408.
45 Id. at 409.
46 Circuit courts that have applied the misappropriation theory to securities fraud
cases include the Second Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981), Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); the Third Cir-
cuit, see, e.g., Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); the Seventh Circuit, see,
e.g., Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995);
and the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
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considerations behind the misappropriation theory and Part V
will state the conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. State v. O'Hagan
O'Hagan, an attorney and partner with the Minneapolis law
firm of Dorsey and Whitney, was convicted in a Minnesota state
court of misappropriating client trust funds between October 1986
and March 1988. 47 These criminal charges resulted from the
firm's discovery that O'Hagan had taken money out of two client
trust fund accounts to pay off his personal bank loans.48
O'Hagan claimed during the state trial that he understood
that temporarily taking money from a client's account was allowa-
ble at the discretion of the client's attorney. However, it later be-
came clear that O'Hagan unlawfully took the money when both
clients at trial denied giving O'Hagan permission to take the
money from their accounts. 49  O'Hagan was subsequently dis-
barred ° and convicted of misappropriation. 1
B. Securities and Exchange Commission v. O'Hagan
1. The Facts and the Charges
In the summer of 1988, O'Hagan received material, nonpublic
information from another partner in the firm, Thomas Tinkham.52
The information concerned a tender offer53 about to be made by
the firm's client, Grand Met PLC, for the common shares of a tar-
get company, Pillsbury. Shortly thereafter, O'Hagan purchased a
total of 7,500 shares in Pillsbury: 5,000 shares of common stock 54
47 State v. O' Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
48 Id. at 616-17. The two trust accounts consisted of settlement money that had been
obtained for two of O'Hagan's clients; the Mayo Clinic and Northrup King & Co.
49 Id. at 615-16.
50 In re O'Hagan, 450 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1990).
51 State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d at 615. Therefore, by the time federal securities
charges were later filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission against O'Hagan, he
already had one conviction on his record. He had displayed a tendency toward misconduct
by significantly deviating from the firm's standard practice of not allowing attorneys to
take money out of clients' accounts for their personal use.
52 No charges were filed against Mr. Tinkham, who was said to have been unaware of
O'Hagan's intent on acquiring Pillsbury stock. Brief for Appellee at 9, United States v.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 94-3714 and 94-3856).
53 "A tender offer is a public announcement by a company or individual indicating that
it will pay a price above the current market price for the shares 'tendered' of a company it
wishes to acquire or take control of." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1468 (6th ed. 1990). In
general, see Denis Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569
(1973).
54 Common stock is a class of stock that allows for ultimate or residual ownership of
the corporation. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 278 (6th ed. 1990).
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and an additional 2,500 shares on a call option contract55 basis.
Immediately after the takeover was announced in the fall of 1988,
O'Hagan sold these shares, realizing a profit of over $4 million.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged O'Hagan
with misappropriating insider information in violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.56 The SEC
also charged O'Hagan with perpetrating securities fraud in viola-
tion of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 promulgated under Section
14(e).57 O'Hagan was convicted in a Minnesota district court in
1994 of 57 counts of securities fraud, mail fraud and money laun-
dering.58 The court also ordered a disgorgement of O'Hagan's prof-
its, and permanently enjoined him from engaging in any securities
trading.59 O'Hagan appealed his securities fraud convictions on
the grounds that the government's use of the misappropriation
theory was an inapplicable theory of Section 10(b) liability on
which to convict him."
2. The Reversal
After reviewing the language of the Section 10(b), which ex-
plicitly requires "deception," the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that "deception" is not a necessary component of the
misappropriation theory.6 1 The court then proceeded not only to
reverse O'Hagan's securities fraud convictions, but also to over-
turn his mail fraud and money laundering convictions, which were
predicated on the securities fraud convictions.6 2 The court also or-
dered the forfeiture of O'Hagan's profits. The court further noted
in its opinion that "[N] either the Supreme Court nor this court has
yet determined whether the misappropriation theory is a permis-
sible basis upon which to impose 10(b) liability."63
In reversing O'Hagan's securities fraud, mail fraud and
money laundering convictions,' the Eighth Circuit joined the
55 "A call option is a negotiable instrument whereby writer of option, for a certain sum
of money (the 'premium'), grants to the buyer of option the irrevocable right to demand,
within a specified time, the delivery by the writer of a specified number of shares of a stock
at a fixed price (the 'exercise' or 'striking' price)." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 204 (6th ed.
1990).
56 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1985); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1998). Taken from O'Hagan, 92 F.3d
at 615.
57 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 625. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1985); 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3(a) (1998).
This case note does not address Section 14 or Rule 14.
58 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612; Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461,
1474 (D. Minn. 1995).
59 O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp at 1472.
60 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622.
61 Id. at 617.
62 Id. at 628.
63 Id. at 617.
64 Id. at 612.
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Fourth Circuit,65 the only other federal circuit which has expressly
refused to base a securities fraud conviction on the misappropria-
tion theory.66 The rulings of the Eighth and Fourth Circuit courts
stand in sharp contrast to those of the Second,67 Third, 6 Seventh69
and Ninth70 Circuit courts, all of which have embraced the misap-
propriation theory, and welcomed its application to securities
fraud cases.
C. U.S. Supreme Court Applies Misappropriation Theory in
United States v. O'Hagan
The government's efforts to reinstate O'Hagan's prior convic-
tions in an en banc hearing by the Eighth Circuit were unsuccess-
ful.7' However, the denial was followed by a granting of certiorari
by the U.S. Supreme Court.72 The Court reinstated O'Hagan's
prior convictions based on the misappropriation theory.73 The de-
cision settles the long-standing dispute regarding the application
of the misappropriation theory in securities fraud cases.4 The
Court's official endorsement of the misappropriation theory in se-
curities fraud cases also sends a resounding new warning
throughout the securities world: "Outsiders" who trade on misap-
propriated information are just as liable under the misappropria-
tion theory for insider trading as "insiders" are under the classical
theory.
II. ORIGINS OF MISAPPROPRIATION
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
An understanding of the origins of the misappropriation the-
ory requires a closer look at the background of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 originated as part of the
65 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949 (4th Cir. 1995).
66 The misappropriation theory was first used by the government in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980), cited in Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Clark, 915
F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1990). The theory was first adopted by the court, however, in
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cited in Bryan, 58 F.3d at 954.
67 Newman, 664 F.2d at 12; Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1984).
6s Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), on remand, 628 F. Supp. 746
(E.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd and remanded, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1017 (1987).
69 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); Securities &
Exch. Comm'n v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
70 Clark, 915 F.2d at 439.
71 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir.), reh'g en bane denied (8th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
72 Id.
73 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
74 Jonathan E.A. ten Oever, Note, Insider Trading and the Dual Role of Information,
106 YALE L.J. 1325 (1997).
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New Deal legislation regulating securities exchanges. 5 In 1942,
the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-
5.76 Section 10(b) prohibits deceptive conduct,7 7 while Rule 10b-5
proscribes fraudulent conduct."5
A proper analysis of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires a
close look at the statutory language.7 9 The language of these pro-
visions lays the foundation for the misappropriation theory.
Section 10(b), in part, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change...
b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."0
Rule 10b-5, in part, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, [or]
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.8"
An important difference exists in the language of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 speak of
"deception" 2 in the same context of "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.""3 The key difference is that Sec-
75 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-28 (1975).
76 Id. at 729.
77 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616.
75 Id. at 615.
79 "Ernst & Ernst makes clear that in deciding whether a complaint states a cause of
action for 'fraud' under Rule 10b-5, 'we turn first to the language of § 10(b), for "[tihe start-
ing point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."'" Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring))).
80 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1985).
81 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1998).
82 "The act of deceiving; intentional misleading by falsehood spoken or acted." BLAcK's
LAw DICTIONARY 406 (6th ed. 1990).
83 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, at 615.
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tion 10(b) refers to a prohibition of "manipulation," 4 whereas Rule
10b-5 refers to a prohibition of "fraud."8 5 Section 10(b) bans only
that which the Securities Exchange Commission specifically pros-
cribes, namely manipulation and/or deception in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security. 6 However, Rule 10b-5, which
was specifically created as an addendum to Section 10(b), 7 in-
troduces a proscription against fraud, which is not specifically in-
cluded in the proscription on manipulation and deception as
defined by Rule 10(b). At the same time, however, it has been de-
clared that Rule 10b-5 does not extend liability beyond that con-
duct which Section 10(b) specifically prohibits.8 8
Rule 10b-5 has been said to require the element of scienter or
intent in wrongdoing,8 9 while Section 10(b) has been described as
a general antifraud statute.9 ° Section 10(b) has also been referred
to as the "catch-all" section.91 The statute was originally worded
to protect only brokers and dealers involved in securities
purchases from deceptive conduct, while the rule was added to ex-
tend protection against intentional fraudulent conduct to anyone
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.2
By proscribing intentional fraudulent conduct, Rule 10b-5
closed a gap in coverage that the language of Section 10(b) had
84 Id. Manipulation has been defined to be a term of art within the securities market
context, referring to practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices to inten-
tionally mislead the investing public by artificially influencing market prices. Id. at 615
n.4 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976))).
85 "A false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury." BLcacks LAw DICTIoNARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
86 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).
87 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 n.32.
88 Id. at 214 (1976). In United States v. O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit extrapolated the
restricted interpretation of Rule 10b-5 from the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of
Section 10(b) in Central Bank of Denver: "With respect . . . to . . . the scope of conduct
prohibited by Section 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision." O'Hagan, 92 F.3d
at 616. However, Central Bank's ruling pertains to an aiding and abetting charge, not to
insider trading activities. While Section 10(b) and accompanying Rule 10b-5 were intended
to proscribe activities in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, they were not
intended to cover aiding and abetting charges.
89 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214.
90 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1991).
91 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 202. The term "catch-all," however, belongs to Thomas
G. Corcoran, the spokesman for the drafters of Section 10(b). Id.
92 "The Securities & Exch. today announced the adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud
by any person in connection with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers." SEC Re-
lease No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission concur-
rent with the adoption of Rule 10b-5), quoted in Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 n.32.
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previously left open.93 However, the Eighth Circuit's narrow in-
terpretation of "fraud" in Rule 10b-5 ignored the purpose of the
Rule. The specific language at issue in the Eighth Circuit's review
of the O'Hagan case involved the word "deception" as an element
of Section 10(b) and the term "fraud" in Rule 10b-5. The court
understood "fraud" was used to define the scope of "deception." 4
The Eighth Circuit concluded that "fraud" as used in Rule 10b-5,
could not be construed to refer to a prohibition that was broader
than what "deception" referred to in Section 10(b) because Rule
10b-5 grew out of Section 10(b). s5 Therefore, despite the rule's pur-
pose in extending coverage to reach fraudulent securities conduct,
the Eighth Circuit narrowly construed Rule 10b-5 within the con-
fines of the statutory language set forth in Section 10(b).
The Eighth Circuit's decision resulted from the refusal to
broaden the statutory language of "deception" to encompass the
meaning of "fraud" as used in Rule 10b-5. This strict construction
caused the Eighth Circuit to conclude that the misappropriation
theory did not provide the requisite "deception" element upon
which Section 10(b) liability could be based. Furthermore, there
was no basis for finding "deception" "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."9"
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found O'Hagan met
the "deceptive" element within the meaning of Section 10(b) when
he intentionally failed to disclose to Dorsey & Whitney, and its
client, Grand Met, that he planned to trade on the confidential,
material information he received from a Dorsey and Whitney part-
ner regarding Pillsbury: "Concretely, it was O'Hagan's failure to
disclose his personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach
of his duty to do so, that made his conduct 'deceptive' under Sec-
tion 10(b)."97
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found the "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security" element had been estab-
lished when O'Hagan purchased and sold his Pillsbury stock with-
out the knowledge of Dorsey & Whitney or Grand Met: "This
93 "The new rule closes a loophole in the protection against fraud administered by the
Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage
in fraud in their purchase." Id.
94 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615. Deception within the language of Section 10(b) has been
defined as "the making of a material misrepresentation or the nondisclosure of material
information in violation of a duty to disclose." United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945
(4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977)).
95 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615.
96 Id. at 617.
97 United States v. O Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2211 (1997). Justice Ginsburg also
points out that when the trader owes a fiduciary duty to more than one person, as in a
relationship involving a lawyer, his law firm and the client, the trader's disclosure to only
one of the parties may still not shield the trader from liability under the misappropriation
theory. Id. at 2209 n.7.
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element is satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated
not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but
when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information
to purchase or sell securities."98
B. Interpretation of the Statutory Language
The Eighth Circuit cited several cases which supported its
conclusion that the language of the statute cannot be more
broadly construed than what the words explicitly state.99 At the
same time, other courts have also acknowledged tremendous con-
cern for ensuring fairness and integrity of conduct within the se-
curities markets; a concern which underlies the securities laws. 100
Clearly the scope of Rule 10b-5 cannot exceed the power of the
Commission under Section 10(b). 101 However, some courts had
chosen to narrowly interpret the statutory language. 102 The
Eighth Circuit sided with a narrow interpretation of Section 10(b),
thereby reversing O'Hagan's convictions based on the intent ex-
pressed by the explicit statutory language of Section 10(b). 103
In reviewing the statutory language more closely, however,
another logical inference may be made. The framers of Rule 10b-5
intended to expand coverage over proscribed conduct that was im-
plicitly but not expressly prohibited by Section 10(b). Little pur-
pose is served in including the word "fraud" in Rule 10b-5 if its
meaning is restricted by the preexisting meaning of "deception" in
Section 10(b). While fraud is a vehicle by which one can deceive,'10 4
fraud and deceit are not synonymous in meaning. Fraud com-
prises all acts, omissions and concealments involving a breach of a
legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another. 105 The
inclusion of "fraud" in Rule 10b-5 was not simply to restate the
meaning of "deception." Otherwise, "deception" would have been
inserted in Rule 10b-5 as well. A logical inference is that the in-
98 Id. at 2209.
99 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615 (citing Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 174 (1994) and Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)
(quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)); See also Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978))).
loo United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1986). This concern is
echoed in the majority opinion rendered by the Supreme Court in the O'Hagan case: "The
theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to ensure honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
loi Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst,
425 U.S. at 214).
102 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
1o3 "It is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability be-
yond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text." O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617 (citing
Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177).
104 Id. at 615 n.4.
105 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
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sertion of "fraud," which has a broader meaning than "deception,"
is supportive of an expansive rather than a narrow interpretation
of the statutory language of Section 10(b).
C. The Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory was born out of a need to reach
those who previously could not be held liable under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. The theory allows for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 violations for fraud when a person "(1) misappropriates material
nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a re-
lationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses the information in a
securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed any du-
ties to the shareholders of the traded stock."10 6 The misappropria-
tion theory does not involve a requisite showing of a defrauded
party, or that the party from whom the misappropriator obtained
the material nonpublic information was even involved in any se-
curities transaction. 107 The theory merely requires a showing of a
breach of fiduciary duty between the misappropriating securities
trader and the party from whom the information was obtained. 10
At the same time, the misappropriation theory specifically ad-
dresses misappropriators operating in the area of securities
transactions. 09
D. Outsiders and Fiduciary Duties
The Eighth Circuit dismissed the argument that O'Hagan
owed a duty to Pillsbury because he was an outsider in relation to
Pillsbury. 110 Similarly, in United States v. Bryan,"' the Fourth
Circuit criticized Moss v. Morgan Stanley"2 for misinterpreting a
footnote in United States v. Newman 113 to mean an outsider owed
106 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
107 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
lo8 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 616 (citing Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944, quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at
443).
lo9 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997).
lio While no standard definition exists for "outsider," it has been thought to refer to
both tippees and recipients of information by insiders who breach a fiduciary duty in doing
so. Andre, supra note 18, at 874. Andre also refers to List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
111 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 956 n.23.
112 Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984).
113 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981). The Bryan court
criticized the Moss court's interpretation of footnote 1 of the Newman opinion, which reads
as follows: "In two instances the targets themselves were clients of the investment banking
firms. The Government belatedly suggests that the indictment should be construed to al-
leged securities laws violations in these two instances, on the theory that the defendants,
by purchasing stock in the target companies, defrauded the shareholders of those compa-
nies. Whatever validity that approach might have, it is not fairly within the allegations of
the indictment, which allege essentially that the defendants defrauded the investment
banking firms and the firms' takeover clients." Id. at 15. The Bryan court found the Moss
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a duty to a target company that was not a "client" of the outsider's
company.'14 Further, the Bryan court criticized Moss for its fail-
ure to show whether or how the defendant outsider owed a duty to
the "non client" target company. 1
15
O'Hagan was neither an employee nor a current shareholder
of the target company, Pillsbury, prior to his sudden purchases of
the Pillsbury stock. However, he was a partner of the firm en-
gaged by Grand Met, which confidentially disclosed to the firm its
intent to make a tender offer for Pillsbury stock. Even though
Grand Met may not have been O'Hagan's particular client, Grand
Met was a client of O'Hagan's law firm. A partner in a law firm is
an agent who acts not only on behalf of its clients, but also on
behalf of the other partners." 6 Grand Met could also then be re-
garded as a client of O'Hagan's. Therefore, O'Hagan owed a fidu-
ciary duty to Grand Met and its shareholders not to act upon the
material nonpublic information he indirectly obtained from Grand
Met without first disclosing his intentions to Grand Met. O'Hagan
also owed a duty to his law firm partnership not to act on this
nonpublic information without prior disclosure to the partnership.
A partnership, by definition, requires that each partner owes a fi-
duciary duty not only to his or her client, but also to fellow
partners."7
Pillsbury was admittedly not a "client" of the law firm, per se.
However, O'Hagan could still be shown to indirectly owe a fiduci-
ary duty to Pillsbury's shareholders through his firm's direct asso-
ciation with its client. Grand Met initially disclosed the
confidential information regarding Pillsbury, which O'Hagan later
used for his sole advantage. In doing so, O'Hagan caused injury to
Pillsbury's shareholders who did not have the same trading ad-
court's interpretation to be flawed for two reasons: first, because the footnote did not at-
tempt to "limit" the holding of the case; and second, because the footnote failed to address
"whether or how" Newman and his accomplices could have owed a duty to the target com-
pany, which was not a client of the accomplices' employer, Morgan Stanley. Bryan, 58 F.3d
at 956 n.23.
114 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 956 n.23.
115 Id.
116 Section 9(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 states: "Every partner is an
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, in-
cluding the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying
on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the
partnership. .. "
117 "The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners
are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c)." Uniform
Partnership Act, § 404(a), cited in Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure Obligations of Partners
Inter Se Under The Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994: Is the Contractarian Revolu-
tion Failing?, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1559, 1631 n.16 (1995), reprinted in 36 CORP. PRAC.
COMMENTATOR 923 (1995).
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vantage O'Hagan possessed through the material, nonpublic
information.118
The Eighth Circuit viewed O'Hagan's purchase of Pillsbury's
stock as a legitimate arm's-length transaction."9 This premise
would be valid if O'Hagan had not known the confidential infor-
mation regarding the identity of Grand Met's tender offer target,
but had simply deduced it120 based on financial expertise or
through some other legitimate means. However, O'Hagan gained
a tremendous financial windfall by using nonpublic material infor-
mation he had intentionally obtained directly from a Dorsey and
Whitney partner and indirectly from a firm client. In doing so, he
not only gained an unfair advantage over ordinary investors, but
he also breached a fiduciary duty explicitly owed to the firm and a
duty implicitly' 2' owed to the client.
III. APPLICATION OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. United States v. Newman
The Second Circuit was the first appellate court to apply the
misappropriation theory. In Newman, the Second Circuit used the
theory to reverse a United States District Court's prior dismissal
of charges for illegal insider trading activity which did not involve
a direct relationship between the parties.'22 James Mitchell New-
man, a securities trader and manager of a brokerage firm's over-
the-counter trading department, misappropriated inside informa-
tion he received from two employees of two investment banking
firms, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. and Kuhn Loeb & Co., regard-
ing proposed mergers and acquisitions. He and two co-conspira-
tors 2 3 purchased stock in the target companies of the proposed
11s This unfair trading advantage forms the basis for the policy considerations underly-
ing the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5: "[Tihe Rule is based in policy on the justifi-
able expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges, have relatively equal access to material information." Securities & Exch.
Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
119 This inference is based on a statement made by Chief Justice Burger in his famous
Chiarella dissent, "As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction
has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some
confidential or fiduciary relation." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239-40 (1980).
An arm's-length transaction is understood to be a complete transaction between two unre-
lated parties acting in their own interest. Andre, supra note 18, at 872.
12o The Court in Chiarella used the word "deduced" to describe how Vincent Chiarella
determined the identities of the target companies. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
121 A fiduciary relationship implies that an individual entering into one will not use
any revealed confidential information to that individual's advantage. Securities & Exch.
Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Securities & Exch. Comm'n v.
Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990)).
122 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
123 While additional defendants were named in the indictment as co-conspirators, only
Newman was within the district court's jurisdiction. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
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mergers and takeovers and shared the profits with the two em-
ployees. The Second Circuit held Newman's conduct "could be
found to constitute a criminal violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, despite the fact neither Morgan Stanley or Kuhn Loeb, nor
their clients, were at the time purchasers or sellers of the target
company securities or in any transaction with any of the defend-
ants."'24 The court based the requisite finding of fraud on New-
man's use of material, nonpublic information, contrary to an
implicit agreement not to do so.' 2 '
O'Hagan also profited from gaining access to confidential, ma-
terial information from an insider. Newman and O'Hagan both re-
ceived confidential information from tippers. However, unlike
Newman's tippers, O'Hagan's tipper did not share in the profits.
Newman involved a knowing tipper. In O'Hagan, Tinkham was
an unknowing tipper and, in fact, also appeared to be suspicious of
O'Hagan after disclosing the material nonpublic information to
O'Hagan. 126
Newman had no direct relationship with the company in
whose stock his clients traded. O'Hagan also had no direct rela-
tionship with the company in whose stock he traded. Newman did
not hold a fiduciary position with his company. O'Hagan, on the
other hand, held a fiduciary position within his firm. Therefore,
unlike Newman, O'Hagan owed a duty to the firm's clients. The
fiduciary status may have entitled him to certain officer perks.
However, any perks no more included insider trading and profit-
ing from misusing a client's nonpublic material information than
they would have allowed him to embezzle money out of client trust
funds to pay his personal loans.'27
Even though Newman did not have a fiduciary relationship
with Morgan Stanley or Kuhn Loeb or their clients, he was still
found to owe a duty to the shareholders of these investment bank-
ing companies and the target companies. 12  As a fiduciary,
O'Hagan is held to an even higher standard than a nonfiduciary
like Newman. In light of the holding in Newman, O'Hagan should
124 Id. at 16.
125 Clark, 915 F.2d at 445 (citing Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-18).
126 Tinkham's suspicions concerning O'Hagan began with the conversation initiated by
O'Hagan in the doorway of Tinkham's office regarding the Pillsbury takeover. Tinkham
believed OIagan's interest in Pillsbury to be of a highly irregular nature. Brief for Appel-
lee at 8-9, United States v. 0' Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 94-3714 and 94-
3856). Later, Tinkham was observed by O'Hagan's secretary to be going through
O'Hagan's mail while OHagan was away in Europe. Confirmation slips of purchases of
Pillsbury options were among the mail pieces. Brief for Appellant at 9, O'Hagan (No. 94-
3714).
127 O'Hagan had previously been convicted of "theft by temporary taking" in a Minne-
sota state criminal trail for unlawfully taking money out of his clients' trust fund accounts
at Dorsey and Whitney. State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
128 Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
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be held liable for his actions. O'Hagan stood in closer proximity as
fiduciary to the shareholders of Pillsbury and Grand Met than
Newman in relation to the shareholders of Morgan Stanley and
Kuhn Loeb or their clients. Such inconsistency in declaring that
one who is clearly in a greater fiduciary position is not liable,
while another who owes a lesser duty is liable, gives rise to an
inexplicable result. The Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan re-
stores consistency and logic to the scenario.
B. Chiarella v. United States
The Newman holding, which is the most widely accepted view
of the misappropriation theory to date,129 stands in sharp contrast
to the Supreme Court's holdings in Chiarella v. United States3 °
and Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission.1 3 1 The
Supreme Court set forth the first restriction in Chiarella, holding
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could only be imposed
based on a relationship of trust and confidence between the par-
ties to disclose, material nonpublic information. A mere posses-
sion of material nonpublic information is insufficient. 32 Vincent
Chiarella, a print shop employee, had deduced the identities of
takeover target companies from the announcements his employer
received from the acquiring companies. Even though Chiarella
was in possession of nonpublic information, he was found to owe
no duty to the sellers of the stocks he purchased, based on the
absence of any special relationship with them.
O'Hagan is clearly distinguishable from Chiarella. Chiarella
merely deduced the identities of the target companies prior to
purchasing their stock, where O'Hagan intentionally elicited the
target company's identity from another attorney in his firm. No
relationship existed between Chiarella and the target companies.
However, O'Hagan was indirectly tied as a fiduciary partner to
Pillsbury and its shareholders through his firm's fiduciary rela-
tionship with Grand Met.
Both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Chiarella
stated that the question of whether the defendant breached a duty
he owed others, including the acquiring corporation and his em-
ployer, had not been presented. If it had, the Court may have up-
held Chiarella's securities fraud convictions. 33 However, the
Court noted the conviction could not rest on a theory which had
not been presented to the jury. As Justice Powell remarked,
129 Clark, 915 F.2d at 445.
130 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
131 Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).
132 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
133 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 1:119
Insider Trading and U.S. v. O'Hagan
[T]he United States offers an alternative theory to support
petitioner's conviction. It argues that petitioner breached a
duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon informa-
tion that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of
a printer employed by the corporation .... We need not decide
whether this theory has merit for it was not submitted to the
jury.14
Justice Powell's comment also served as a reminder that a theory
which is not introduced at trial cannot be argued on appeal.
In Chiarella, misappropriation assumed an appropriately
negative connotation in being equated with stealing. As dissent-
ing Chief Justice Burger stated in Chiarella, "In sum, the evi-
dence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella, working literally in
the shadows of the warning signs in the print shop, misappropri-
ated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information en-
trusted to him in the utmost confidence.""' Like Chiarella,
O'Hagan had also been accused of stealing.
As a partner in a law firm, O'Hagan was obligated to refrain
from misusing confidential client information. O'Hagan special-
ized in the area of securities law. His duty as a partner and his
knowledge as an expert in the area of securities law caused him to
be fully aware of the illegality of misappropriating clients' non-
public material information. He, therefore, knowingly broke the
law by trading in material, nonpublic information.
O'Hagan's obligations to his firm and his clients were even
greater than those of a printing shop employee. While O'Hagan's
status as a partner entitled him to certain rights, it also held him
to a higher standard of accountability for his actions. A partners'
core rights and obligations are status-based, unamendable and
broadly construed. 136 O'Hagan's partnership status placed him on
a more intimate basis with the firm's clients than Chiarella's em-
ployee status placed him with his employer's clients. Thus, there
was even less room for O'Hagan to escape liability under the mis-
appropriation theory than there was for Chiarella, because of the
difference in the fiduciary obligations that accompanied their rela-
tive positions within the hierarchical framework of their
companies.
C. Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission
In Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission,37 the
Supreme Court overturned the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 se-
134 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36.
135 Id. at 245.
136 Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform
Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 111, 113 (1990), cited in Vestal, supra note 117.
137 Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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curities fraud conviction of Raymond Dirks, an insurance securi-
ties investment analyst. Dirks had disclosed to investors,
including his clients, information he received from a former officer
of an insurance securities company. This information concerned
the company's fraudulent conduct. The Supreme Court relied on
Chiarella in holding Dirks could not be found guilty of misappro-
priating nonpublic material information because he owed no fidu-
ciary duty to the insurance company's stockholders.13
Dirks undoubtedly stood to improve his future client dealings
by giving clients the nonpublic material information he received.
However, Dirks neither went looking for this information, nor did
he personally trade on the information. He disclosed the material,
nonpublic information in an effort to expose the insurance com-
pany's fraudulent conduct. An attempt to expose this fraud was,
in fact, stated to be the motivating reason behind the tipper's be-
havior in approaching Dirks with the information.139 At one point,
Dirks even stepped in to investigate and expose the fraudulent
activity on his own after all other investigative efforts had
failed. 4 °
O'Hagan, on the other hand, unlawfully withheld secret.. in-
formation that he actively solicited'42 from another partner in the
firm. He then acted on this information, even though he knew it
gave him at an unfair advantage over other investors. In
Chiarella, dissenting Chief Justice Burger noted a Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 conviction should stand when "an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or in-
dustry, but by some unlawful means."143
Dirks was accused of disclosing nonpublic material informa-
tion to his clients, while O'Hagan was tried for profiting from not
disclosing material, nonpublic information. Clearly, Dirks would
not be convicted under the misappropriation theory, unlike
O'Hagan, simply on the basis of the traditional "duty to disclose or
refrain" rule set forth in In Re Cady, Roberts & Co.'"
138 Id. at 667.
139 Id. at 666.
140 Id. at 649.
141 The word "secret" was a bone of contention between O'Hagan's attorneys and the
government's attorneys. O'Hagan's attorneys argued the use of the word "secret" was mis-
leading, based on the absence of any alleged "secret" information. Brief for Appellant at 13,
14, 18-19, United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-3714). The gov-
ernment argued that the information O'Hagan had gleaned from pumping Tinkham about
the Pillsbury takeover deal was nonpublic at that time and, therefore, constituted "secret"
information. Brief for Appellee at 18, 29, O'Hagan (Nos. 94-3714 and 94-3856).
142 Brief for Appellee at 8-9.
143 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980).
144 "The obligation to disclose or refrain derives from [a]n affirmative duty to disclose
material information [, which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' par-
ticularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts have consist-
ently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of
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Dirks spoke out while O'Hagan remained silent. While Dirks
shared his information with others, O'Hagan concealed his infor-
mation from others. Silence may constitute a fraudulent act when
there is a duty to speak, especially within the context of securities
trading."'
D. Classical Theory v. Misappropriation Theory
The holdings of Dirks and Chiarella suggest that liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must also be predicated upon
a finding that the buyer or seller of the securities has been de-
frauded by the alleged misappropriator. 146 These cases, however,
also operate under the classical theory of liability which enables
corporation insiders and tippees of those insiders to come within
the language set forth under Rule 10b-5.147 Even later cases ap-
pear to have based their holdings on a narrow Section 10(b) inter-
pretation intended to specifically encompass fraudulent
conduct. 148
The misappropriation theory does not require showing the
buyer or seller of securities has been defrauded. 149 Unlike the
common law elements of fraud,'5 ° upon which Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 liability is based under the classical theory, the misap-
propriation theory does not narrowly focus only on the purchaser
or seller in a securities transaction. Instead, it extends the prohi-
bition of deception to protect anyone in rightful possession of the
material, nonpublic information, even if that possessor is neither
an investor nor a market participant.' Also, unlike the classical
their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment." Id. at 227 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)).
145 "The American Law Institute recognizes that 'silence when there is a duty to ...
speak may be a fraudulent act.'" Id. at 228 n.9 (quoting ALI, Federal Securities Code
§ 262(b) (Prop. Off. Draft 1978)).
146 Michael Kenny & Theresa Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the
Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REv. 139
(1995) (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 55, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992)).
147 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1991).
148 Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 146, at 139, 151. The authors cite to the following
cases: Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994); Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 222; Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); and Bateman, Eichler,
Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
149 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981)).
15o "Elements of a cause of action for 'fraud' include false representation of a past or
present fact made by defendant, action in reliance thereupon by plaintiff, and damage re-
sulting to plaintiff from such misrepresentation." BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed.
1990) (quoting Citizens Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Gilley, 521 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975)).
151 Carpenter, 79 F.2d at 1029.
1998]
Chapman Law Review
theory, which requires a showing of deception, the misappropria-
tion merely requires a breach of fiduciary duty. 152 The Seventh
Circuit in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cherif stated,
"The misappropriation theory focuses not on the insider's fiduci-
ary duty to the issuing company or its shareholders, but on
whether the insider breached a fiduciary duty to any lawful pos-
sessor of material, nonpublic information."5 3
1. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cherif
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cherif,"' the Sev-
enth Circuit upheld Danny Cherif's securities fraud convictions on
the basis of the misappropriation theory, despite the absence of a
fiduciary duty owed to shareholders of corporations which were
the subject of the misappropriated information. Cherif, a former
Chicago bank employee, continued to use his identification card
after his employment was terminated. By doing so, he was able to
access confidential bank information regarding proposed tender
offers and leveraged buy-outs of four companies in whose stock he
used to trade. Cherif owed no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of
those companies. However, his continued use of his identification
card, as well as his use of specific, confidential bank information,
was found to be a clear breach of a continuing fiduciary duty to his
former employer. 55
The Seventh Circuit held Rule 10b-5 was compatible with the
misappropriation theory. Specifically, the court ruled that an em-
ployee's breach of a fiduciary duty to his employer constituted a
Rule 10b-5 violation, even if the employee or his employer was not
found to owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company
from whom the employee purchased the shares as an inside
trader. 56 In the same vein, even if O'Hagan was found not to have
owed a fiduciary duty to Pillsbury, he clearly owed a fiduciary
duty to his partnership, Dorsey and Whitney, and then to Grand
Met, one of the firm's clients. In Cherif, liability was affirmed, de-
spite the fact that Cherifs inside trading activities occurred after
he no longer worked for his employer. O'Hagan purchased stock
in Pillsbury while a partner at Dorsey and Whitney. Further-
more, he purchased the stock while Dorsey and Whitney were re-
tained by Grand Met to plan the takeover of Pillsbury.157
152 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (4th Cir. 1995).
153 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991).
154 Id. at 410.
155 Id. at 411.
156 Id. at 409.
157 Brief for Appellee at 11, United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (Nos.
94-3714 and 94-3856).
140 [Vol. 1:119
Insider Trading and U.S. v. O'Hagan
A case which is very similar to O'Hagan is Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. Clark.15 In Clark, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the prior conviction of John Naylor Clark III, a former
medical supplies company president, who had been charged with
violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in misappropriating mate-
rial nonpublic information gained from his employer."5 9 Clark
learned of his company's confidential plans to acquire a surgical
glove company after soliciting an associate in his office. Clark
used that nonpublic information to engage in insider trading.
Like O'Hagan, Clark profited from misusing material, nonpublic
information he obtained after initiating conversation about the
nonpublic information with an associate he knew was privy to the
information. Clark was convicted of securities fraud under the
misappropriation theory. Clark's convictions were later affirmed
by a circuit court that, like the U.S. Supreme Court, broadly con-
strued the statutory language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
order to promote a level playing field in the area of securities law.
2. United States v. Carpenter
Another case analogous to O'Hagan is United States v. Car-
penter,6 ° which involved employees who engaged in insider trad-
ing using knowledge gained from their employer while they were
still employed. The employees were found to have breached a fi-
duciary duty owed to their employer.'61 R. Foster Winans, a re-
porter for the Wall Street Journal, was convicted of
misappropriating material, nonpublic information he gained from
the Wall Street Journal during his employment, regarding stock
information he received from stockbrokers in preparing his col-
umn, "Heard on the Street." Kenneth Felis, a stockbroker with
Kidder Peabody, was convicted of conspiring to commit securities
fraud, and David Carpenter, a news clerk for the Journal, was
convicted of aiding and abetting.162 The Second Circuit held
"[Slection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 proscribe an employee's unlawful misappropriation . . . of
material nonpublic information ... 163 While Carpenter did not
involve information that was unavailable to the public, and the
Wall Street Journal was not involved in trading securities,'6 the
court upheld the misappropriation theory as a basis upon which to
affirm a securities fraud conviction.'65 The court's ruling in Car-
158 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
159 Id. at 448.
160 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1035 (2d Cir. 1986).
161 Id. at 1028.
162 Id. at 1024.
163 Id. at 1025.
164 Clark, 915 F.2d at 446.
165 Id.
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penter further substantiates the application of the misappropria-
tion theory to securities fraud cases, such as O'Hagan.
The ruling in Carpenter reinforces the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to apply the misappropriation theory in other insider trading
cases, such as O'Hagan, which also involved a breach of fiduciary
duty. While O'Hagan bears some similarity to Chiarella and
Dirks, the Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks refused to apply
the misappropriation theory because the defendants were not
found to owe a fiduciary duty. The breach of a fiduciary duty lies
at the core of the misappropriation theory. Therefore, the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship is the critical factor needed to sus-
tain a conviction under the misappropriation theory.
This fiduciary relationship was not fully addressed in
Chiarella,66 and it was never established in Dirks. However, a
fiduciary relationship was shown to exist in Newman, Cherif,
Clark and Carpenter, where the misappropriation theory was ap-
plied to support a conviction. Furthermore, these fiduciary rela-
tionships all bore a striking similarity to the type of fiduciary
relationships that existed in O'Hagan. As in these four cases,
O'Hagan owed a fiduciary duty which he breached when he traded
on inside information he received during the course of business.
The outcome of O'Hagan, therefore, should be no different than
the outcome of each of these four cases, all of which involved the
breach of fiduciary relationship and the application of the misap-
propriation theory.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Policy Arguments
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in O'Hagan,
there had been a split among the lower courts in determining
whether to narrowly or broadly construe the statutory language
underlying the misappropriation theory. The debate concerning
the application of the misappropriation theory in securities fraud
cases had been additionally fueled by policy arguments on both
sides. Criticism against a broad statutory construction of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been based on the inability to clearly
distinguish between the types of fiduciary or similar relationships
that apply and do not apply under the misappropriation theory.167
In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit stated, "[i]ndeed, although fifteen
years have passed since the theory's inception, no court adopting
the misappropriation theory has offered a principled basis for dis-
166 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980).
167 Note, Securities Law-Insider Trading-Fourth Circuit Rejects Misappropriation
Theory of Rule 10b-5 Fraud Liability, 109 HARv. L. REv. 536, 538 (1995) (citing United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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tinguishing which types of fiduciary or similar relationships of
trust and confidence can give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability and which
cannot."' The Fourth Circuit's ruling essentially declared that
this inability to distinguish these types of relationships prevented
the misappropriation theory from offering much guidance for mar-
ket participants in knowing exactly what types of information
were unlawful for trading purposes.6 9
Support for a narrow 10(b) statutory construction has also
been reflected in the exercise of judicial restraint. A broad inter-
pretation would consist of judicial legislation, which would argua-
bly extend the statute's application beyond what the drafters
intended.' ° In a few prior cases, the Supreme Court looked at the
specific language used in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a basis
for hesitating to broadly construe the language. For example, in
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, the Supreme Court concluded that
the use of the words "manipulative" and "deceptive" showed Con-
gress's intent to narrow rather than expand the application of the
10(b) statute.'7 ' The Supreme Court reasoned that, if Congress
had intended to prohibit other types of conduct under the statute,
that prohibited conduct would have been expressly stated.'7 2
In past cases, the Supreme Court has not only examined the
specific language in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but also its
meaning. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,73 the
Supreme Court looked specifically at the meaning of the language
in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and concluded that construing the
fraud language to apply not just to purchasers and sellers, as it
expressly states, but to the world at large, is stretching the lan-
guage too far.174 The Supreme Court also expressed concern in
Blue Chip Stamps for the potentially excessive litigation that
would undoubtedly arise under a broader construction of the stat-
utory language. 175
It may be difficult to distinguish which fiduciary relationships
apply under the language of Section 10(b). Also, the language of
Rule 10b-5 perhaps should prohibit what is only expressly stated
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
171 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1975), "When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception... and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute . . .
172 Id.
173 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
174 Id. at 733. The narrow construction of Rule 10b-5's fraud language was held to
refer only to purchasers or sellers of securities. This interpretation, also known as the Birn-
baum rule, was based on the court's holding in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1952).
175 Id. at 740.
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in the 10(b) statute. Furthermore, there may be a valid cause for
concern regarding the excessive litigation that a broad construc-
tion of the statute permits.
However, a tremendous concern for fairness and integrity of
conduct within the securities markets underlies the need for a
more expansive construction of the statutory language in Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.176 Primary concern for the maintenance of a
level playing field among securities traders was declared early on
to be the basis for the policy considerations underlying Rule 10b-
5.177 The concern for ensuring honesty and integrity within the
securities markets was recently reiterated by Justice Ginsburg in
rendering the majority's opinion in O'Hagan: "Because undis-
closed trading on the basis of misappropriated, nonpublic informa-
tion both deceives the source of the information and harms
members of the investing public, the misappropriation theory is
tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to ensure
honest markets, thereby promoting investor confidence."178
This same concern previously caused several lower courts to
also argue against a narrow interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage. In Newman, the Second Circuit stated, "[tihe courts, not
the Congress, have limited Rule 10b-5 suits for damages to the
purchasers and sellers of securities . . . a plaintiff need not be a
defrauded purchaser or seller in order to sue for injunctive relief
under Rule 10b-5."" 9 In Newman, the court's decision to endorse
the application of 10b-5 liability beyond mere purchasers and sell-
ers of securities is further supported because the Supreme Court
has never held that the statute's sole purpose is to protect only
purchasers and sellers."' The statute protects against misappro-
priation of nonpublic securities information which can also involve
an individual who is not engaged in the business of buying or sell-
ing securities, but who secretly trades on that information know-
ing that particular information will give him a financial windfall.
The rule set forth in Texas Gulf Sulphur also expanded the
scope of a Section 10(b) violation by regulating insider trading
based on the nature of the material possessed by a misappropriat-
ing trader, rather than on how the misappropriating trader ob-
tained it.181 The rule allows for the mere use of material,
176 United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1986).
177 "The Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market-
place that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information." Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
178 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2204-5 (1997).
179 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1981).
1so Note, supra note 167, at 541.
181 Troy Cichos, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: Its Past, Present,
and Future, 18 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 389, 395 (1995).
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nonpublic information to constitute fraudulent conduct in the
trading of securities. No showing is required of the misappropriat-
ing trader's prior agreement not to use the information for per-
sonal gain."8 2
The absence of clear statutory language placed a heavy bur-
den on the courts to make their own policy judgments regarding
the scope and objectives of the statute and the rule.8 3 The ab-
sence of clear statutory construction also gave rise to a constant
debate among the lower courts as to whether the underlying in-
tent of the statute or its narrow language should govern. It is,
therefore, of little surprise that the courts had previously split in
interpreting the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Also,
historically, the Supreme Court has stayed out of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 cases, allowing the Second Circuit to lead the way.
Only in the past 10 to 15 years has the Supreme Court become
more extensively involved in this area. As a result of its increas-
ing involvement, the Supreme Court has now resolved a long-
standing conflict in favor of a broad statutory interpretation of the
misappropriation theory. The theory now unquestionably applies
to individuals like James Herman O'Hagan, who trade on inside
information, and who are neither "insiders" nor persons who are
found to owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the securities
in which that person has traded. The Supreme Court decision val-
idates most of the circuit court decisions which favored the the-
ory's application to cases bearing striking similarity to O'Hagan.
B. Eighth Circuit's Rejection of the Misappropriation Theory is
Unfounded
The Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan because "it permits the imposition of Section 10(b) liabil-
ity without a particularized showing of misrepresentation or non-
disclosure." 4 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the statutory
language of Section 10(b) explicitly requires a showing of misrep-
resentation or nondisclosure and that the statute cannot be con-
strued more expansively than what the statutory words say.185 In
rendering its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied primarily on the
Fourth Circuit's rationale in Bryan.18 6
In Bryan, the defendant, Elton E. Bryan, was a Virginia state
lottery director accused of manipulating state advertising and
182 Id.
183 Note, supra note 167, at 538.
184 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996).
185 "As we have emphasized before, the 1934 Act cannot be read more broadly than its
language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit." Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980)).
186 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 620; United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
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video lottery gaming contracts, and secretly profiting from invest-
ing in those companies that engaged in business with the Virginia
state lottery. The Fourth Circuit held the government's misappro-
priation theory was inapplicable because the specific statutory
language set forth in Section 10(b) explicitly required a showing of
deception. The language in Rule 10b-5 further supported the stat-
utory intent of Section 10(b), while prior Supreme Court rulings
consistently held the statutory language of Section 10(b) could not
be construed more broadly than the language itself'"7
However, Bryan was wrongly decided. Instead of ruling on
the basis of whether Bryan's conduct fell within the conduct pro-
scribed by Section 10(b), which the Fourth Circuit conceded it
did,'88 the Fourth Circuit concerned itself with only addressing
whether conduct deemed criminal under the language of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could also be declared criminal under the
language of the misappropriation theory."8 9 Instead of applying
the misappropriation theory as other circuit courts had done pre-
viously,190 the Fourth Circuit not only refused to apply the misap-
propriation theory, but declared the theory invalid.' The Fourth
Circuit set a precedent which the Eighth Circuit was quick to
follow.
In addition to following the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Bryan, the Eighth Circuit also based its ruling in O'Hagan on
prior Supreme Court holdings. The Eighth Circuit specifically re-
ferred to the Supreme Court holdings in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green'92 and Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver.'93 The court asserted that a contrary ruling would contra-
dict those holdings. 94
187 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944. The Fourth Circuit commented that, unlike the statutory
language of Section 10(b) which requires "only the use of deception, in the form of material
misrepresentations or omissions .... the misappropriation theory authorizes criminal con-
victions for simple breaches of fiduciary duty and similar relationships of trust and confi-
dence, whether or not the breaches entail deception within the meaning of Section 10(b)
and whether or not the parties wronged by the breaches were purchasers or sellers of se-
curities, or otherwise connected with or interested in the purchase or sale of securities." Id.
18s Id. at 945.
189 Id.
19o Circuit courts which have applied the misappropriation theory to securities fraud
cases include: the Second Circuit see, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d
Cir. 1981); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984); the
Third Circuit see, e.g., Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1985); the Sev-
enth Circuit see, e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991);
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); and the Ninth Circuit see,
e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
191 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 948 n.12.
192 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
193 Id. (citing Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994)).
194 Id.
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In Santa Fe Indus., a Delaware corporation's parent company
and majority stockholder received board approval to merge with
its subsidiary. To facilitate the merger, the parent company exer-
cised Delaware's short-form merger statute which enabled it to of-
fer to buy out the minority shareholders' stock interests at an
independently appraised fair market value.'95 Minority share-
holders, unwilling to accept the price, were told they could petition
the Delaware court for a court-appointed fair market value ap-
praisal. Instead, the minority shareholders filed suit against the
parent company to prevent the merger and recover the value of
the stock they alleged was worth more that what the parent com-
pany offered them. The Supreme Court held charges of fraud and
fiduciary breach, absent a showing of material misrepresentation
or nondisclosure, constituted insufficient grounds for imposing
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability under the misappropriation
theory. 19
6
In Central Bank of Denver, $26 million in bonds were issued
by the plaintiff, Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Authority,
for construction of public improvements on Stetson-Hills, a com-
bined residential and commercial development in Colorado. 197
Central Bank was the trustee for the bond issues.9 ' Landowner
assessment liens covering a total of over 522 acres were used for
the bond issues." The bond provisions dictated the property tied
to those liens be worth a minimum of 160 percent of the bonds'
outstanding principal and interest.200 The bond provisions also re-
quired the project's developer to provide Central Bank with an an-
nual appraisal to show compliance with the 160 percent
requirement. The developer's 1988 appraisal provided to Central
Bank remained unchanged from the 1986 appraisal, despite infor-
mation from the bond's senior underwriter that showed a decrease
in Colorado land values. Central Bank agreed to the developer's
request to delay obtaining an outside appraisal. In the interim,
the Authority defaulted on the bonds, and Central Bank was held
liable. The Supreme Court held the aiding and abetting charges,
absent a showing of manipulation or deception, did not fall within
the statutory language of Section 10(b).210
Santa Fe Indus. and Central Bank of Denver are clearly dis-
tinguishable from O'Hagan. In Santa Fe Indus., the Supreme
195 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
196 Id. at 475.
197 Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 164.
198 Id. at 171.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 With respect to aiding and abetting another who commits a manipulative, deceptive
act, the Supreme Court stated: "The proscription does not include giving aid to a person
who commits a manipulative, deceptive act." Id. at 177.
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Court addressed the question of whether Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 applied to a fiduciary breach between majority and minority
stockholders. Santa Fe Indus. did not involve allegations of mis-
representation or nondisclosure, 22 either one of which must be in-
cluded in bringing Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation charges
under the misappropriation theory. Under the misappropriation
theory, no liability can attach to full disclosure because of the ab-
sence of deception." 3 The absence of nondisclosure, coupled with
the particular facts of the case, made the misappropriation theory
inapplicable to Santa Fe Indus. 204
In Central Bank of Denver, the issue was whether Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied to aiding and abetting charges.
However, Central Bank of Denver did not involve charges of
manipulation or deception, 205 either one of which is required to
bring Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation charges. The
Supreme Court refused to extend liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to one who did not directly engage in manipulative or
deceptive conduct, even though the accused may have aided an-
other who directly engaged in manipulative or deceptive
conduct.2 °6
Unlike Santa Fe Indus. and Central Bank of Denver, O'Hagan
involved evidence of nondisclosure and, therefore, deception. In
Santa Fe Indus., the parent company fully disclosed its merger
plans and its stock price purchase offers to the minority share-
holders.20 7 O'Hagan failed to disclose to shareholders his intent to
trade on a client's takeover target. Furthermore, O'Hagan's fail-
ure to disclose his intent to trade on Pillsbury stock was decep-
tive.20 Central Bank was only indirectly charged with
manipulation and deception through an aiding and abetting
charge. As the Supreme Court correctly pointed out, there is no
aiding and abetting language in Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5.2 °9
O'Hagan was directly charged with deceiving his firm's clients and
202 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977).
203 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2225 (1997). The majority states: "Sim-
ilarly, full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory. Because the
deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of
information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic
information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no Section 10(b) violation ... "Id.
204 Note, supra note 167, at 539 n.25.
205 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177-78
(1994). The majority commented: "We cannot amend the statute to create a liability for
acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the statute."
Id.
206 Id.
207 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2225.
208 Id.
209 The majority commented: "If, as respondents seem to say, Congress intended to
impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words 'aid' and
'abet' in the statutory text. But it did not." Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177.
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the firm by trading on material nonpublic information. The
Supreme Court further clarified in O'Hagan, contrary to the
Eighth Circuit's reading, the statutory phrase "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security" does not mean the duty ex-
tends only to identifiable purchasers or sellers of securities.21 °
In essence, the Eighth Circuit justified its decision in
O'Hagan based on two prior Supreme Court cases that involve as-
pects of the misappropriation theory which bear little resemblance
to O'Hagan. It was, therefore, unreasonable for the Eighth Cir-
cuit to dismiss the merits of the misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan.
V. CONCLUSION
O'Hagan did not make a substantial purchase of the Pills-
bury securities211 because of his financial expertise,212 but because
he breached a fiduciary duty in obtaining inside information.
O'Hagan had also previously been found guilty of misappropria-
tion. His first misappropriation conviction concerned the taking of
client trust fund money. The trust fund accounts constituted con-
fidential information which O'Hagan used for his own purposes,
unbeknownst to his clients. Furthermore, O'Hagan deceived his
clients and breached their trust by unlawfully taking their money.
A fiduciary's deceitful misappropriation of confidential informa-
tion by theft, conversion or breach of trust, has generally been
held to be unlawful. 13
O'Hagan's misappropriation of client funds constitutes a long-
established violation of the law. However, his insider trading ac-
tivities were not as clear a violation of the law. As an "outsider,"
O'Hagan's insider trading activities did not fit within the pro-
scribed conduct traditionally reserved for "insiders" under the
classical theory. An additional problem has been the lack of any
explicit definition of insider trading in the securities laws.214 With-
out the misappropriation theory, "outsiders" who engage in in-
sider trading such as O'Hagan would otherwise be allowed to fall
210 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2233.
211 O'Hagan purchased a total of 2,500 Pillsbury call option contracts which, according
to one options analyst, made O'Hagan at that time the world's largest single purchaser of
Pillsbury call options. Brief for Appellee at 16, 17, O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (Nos. 94-3714 and
94-3856).
212 O'Hagan had an investment portfolio valued at over $5 million prior to his Pillsbury
profit. Brief for Appellant at 2, O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (No. 94-3714). Prior to purchasing
the Pillsbury contracts, O'Hagan had been known to purchase call option contracts on only
one other occasion (this was stock in a high technology company, not stock in a corporate
takeover target), preferring to keep to a strategy of avoiding such high risk stocks. Brief for
Appellee at 10, O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (Nos. 94-3714 and 94-3856).
213 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
214 James B. Stewart, Law Is Still a Bit Murky on Matter of What Constitutes Insider
Trading, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1989, § 1, at 6.
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through the crack, and benefit tremendously, merely because of
their status as "outsiders." The significance of the Supreme
Court's recent ruling in O'Hagan is that courts can now use the
misappropriation theory to reach "outsiders" who trade on inside
information just as effectively as they have been using the classi-
cal theory to convict "insiders" of insider trading. The Supreme
Court's endorsement of the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan
also marks the Supreme Court's official adoption of an expansive
interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
O'Hagan's conduct was patently unconscionable and called
out for judicial retribution. O'Hagan secretly profited from the
use of the material, nonpublic information he had gained from an-
other partner regarding the tender offer of Pillsbury stock. Fur-
thermore, he breached the legal duty he owed his firm and his
firm's client in knowingly failing to disclose his intention to trade
on that information. He intentionally misused this information to
profit at the expense of both the Pillsbury and the Grand Met
stockholders. Such action constitutes deceptive and fraudulent
conduct. It was on those grounds that the Supreme Court held
O'Hagan's conduct to be unlawful.215 An outsider's taking and
profiting from the use of nonpublic securities information in
breach of a fiduciary relationship is now proscribed under the mis-
appropriation theory. The Supreme Court's decision to reinstate
O'Hagan's fraud convictions based on the misappropriation the-
ory, therefore, sends a clear and final warning that everyone
should heed: anyone who trades on nonpublic securities informa-
tion in breach of a fiduciary relationship can be held liable under
the misappropriation theory.
215 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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